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Abstract
The most investigated form of moral hypocrisy is pragmatic hypocrisy in which 
people fake moral commitment for their own advantage. Yet there is also a 
different form of hypocrisy in which people take a moral stance with regard to 
norms they endorse without thereby also expressing a commitment to act morally. 
Rather they do it in order to feel good. We call this hedonic moral hypocrisy. In 
our research, we posit that this kind of hypocrisy comes about when people’s 
overarching goals are shifted in a hedonic direction, that is, in the direction of 
focusing on the way one feels, rather than on moral obligation. Hedonic shifts 
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come about by cues in the environment. People are sometimes sincere when 
expressing a moral stance (i.e. they mean it and also act on it), and sometimes, 
when they are subject to a hedonic shift, they express a moral stance just to make 
them feel good. This also implies that they then decline to do things that make 
them feel bad, such as behaving morally when it takes unrewarded effort to do so. 
In two experimental studies, we find that there is such a thing as hedonic moral 
hypocrisy and that it is indeed brought about by hedonic shifts from cues in the 
environment. This seriously undermines the meaning of a normative consensus for 
norm conformity. Seemingly, for norm conformity without close social control, it 
is not enough that people endorse the same norms, they also have to be exposed 
to situational cues that counteract hedonic shifts. In the discussion, it is suggested 
that societal arrangements that foster the focus on the way one feels and nurture a 
chronic wish to make oneself feel better (for example, in the fun direction through 
advertisements and entertainment opportunities, or in the fear direction by populist 
politicians, social media, economic uncertainties, crises, or wars and displacements) 
are likely to increase hedonic hypocrisy in society.
Keywords
Goal-framing, hedonic hypocrisy, human nature, moral behavior, moral judgments, 
norm conformity, personality, shifting salience effects
Introduction
“Our activity … is largely concerned with moral matters, but as performers 
we do not have a moral concern with them. As performers, we are mer-
chants of morality.” (Goffman, 1959: 251). Why would we play the role of 
“performer” and be morally hypocritical, be a “merchant of morals”? The 
meaning of Goffman’s famous words about our presentation of self in eve-
ryday life seems to be clear in the light of a dramaturgical approach. Yet, his 
explanation on how this works only seemingly solves the puzzle of moral 
hypocrisy. He explains that “the very obligation and profitability of appear-
ing always in a steady moral light, of being a socialized character, forces us 
to be the sort of person who is practiced in the ways of the stage.” In part, 
this is theoretically (not empirically) trivial, because there is a pragmatic 
form of hypocrisy in which people fake moral1 commitment for their own 
advantage. For example, people may be more or less forced to pay lip ser-
vice to social norms they don’t endorse, as might be the case in dictatorships 
and communities with very tight social control. They may even be enticed 
to enforce norms they don’t endorse, just to appear as if they endorsed the 
norms (Willer et al., 2009). People may also be merchants of morals in the 
sense that they take the moral high road vis-à-vis others but transgress their 
own morals when the material gain is high enough (e.g. in tax returns). Yet, 
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in part, Goffman’s way of the stage is not trivial, because casual empiricism 
suggests a truly puzzling phenomenon that we call “hedonic” moral hypoc-
risy:2 People may be sincere when they express commitment to their own 
moral norms. But expressing such a commitment can also be used to make 
one feel good because it signifies to self and others that one is “virtuous,” a 
moral person. Thus, in one situation, people’s expression of moral commit-
ment is sincere, in another situation it is not sincere, even concerning their 
own moral norms and even without expecting some material advantage for 
transgressing. For example, people who find caring for others important 
may at times say so and “mean it” (also by acting on it) and at times only 
express this commitment to make themselves feel good about themselves. If 
true, this would relativize the power of normative consensus. Circumstances 
that would make people hedonically hypocritical could create widespread 
discrepancies between people’s own moral norms and actual moral behav-
ior. At first blush, this might look like a “relative price effect” by which 
behavior becomes less frequent as the price (in terms of effort) for that 
behavior goes up, but it cannot be the whole story because attention to the 
price of behavior varies with the circumstances (Heyman and Ariely, 2004; 
Lindenberg and Frey, 1993).
The question is What mechanisms are at work that make hedonic hypoc-
risy possible and can it be shown empirically that it depends on situational 
factors? In the following, we introduce a brief explanation of a possible 
mechanism for hedonic hypocrisy (and the situational factors influencing it) 
and then test the explanation in two experimental studies.
A theory of hedonic hypocrisy
An important advance in the study of hedonic hypocrisy is the research on 
“moral wiggle room” (Dana et al., 2007) or “self-serving altruism” (Gino 
et al., 2013). The theory behind this research is that people like to feel moral 
concerning their own moral norms. They act morally when they are con-
fronted with clear choices regarding “right” or “wrong,” but exploit any 
ambiguity or flexibility regarding what is right or wrong to behave egoisti-
cally and interpret it in such a way that they still feel moral. This is also what 
Batson et al. (1999) suggested earlier on. This is highly relevant research 
because it points to the important role of feeling moral (not just appearing 
moral, as, among others, Batson, 2011, would suggest). However, it does 
not go far enough in explaining the underlying mechanisms of hedonic 
hypocrisy, because in this research, the goal to feel moral, which drives the 
theory, is basically constant. Situational influences on the goal to feel moral 
are not considered and the goal to feel moral is never confronted with sin-
cerity, that is, the goal to be moral.
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With regard to the goal to be moral, an important lead can be found in the 
work of Monin and Merritt (2012). They argue that moral hypocrisy should 
be conceived as a lack of integrity or sincerity. The counter concept to moral 
hypocrisy, they suggest, is sincerity. In fact, their suggestion implies that we 
cannot deal with hypocrisy if we are not able to deal with sincerity. Monin 
and Merrit suggest we look at what people meant to do rather than the 
inconsistency of verbal expressions and action. This applies to both prag-
matic and hedonic hypocrisy.
For hedonic hypocrisy, we build on these suggestions and we propose 
a goal-based approach that deals with situational changes in salience of 
goals, and particularly with changes (called “hedonic shifts”) in the goal 
that is focused on the way one feels. For quite some time, it has been 
known that the readiness of stored mental constructs to influence mental 
processes and behavior depends on situational factors (Cialdini et al., 
1990; Fiske and Taylor, 2013). This variation in readiness has prominently 
been the focus of research on goals (Bargh and Gollwitzer, 1994). Goals 
are highly sophisticated mental phenomena. They combine cognitive and 
motivational elements and represent a network of concepts, prominently 
those concerning means and causal knowledge. Situational cues and 
affordances can activate a particular goal and, at the same time, inhibit 
other goals (Gollwitzer and Bargh, 1996; Kruglanski and Kopetz, 2009). 
This effect fits well with the finding that making different identities sali-
ent changes the set of one’s preferences considerably (see LeBoeuf et al., 
2010). Goal-framing theory (Lindenberg and Steg, 2007; Steg et al., 2016) 
applies these insights to overarching goals. Our explanation can be briefly 
expounded in seven points:
First, part of the expressive communication about oneself is taking a 
moral stance that signals to self and others that one is a morally committed 
person. Second, expressing to self and others that one is a moral person by 
taking a stringent moral stance makes one feel good. Third, sincerity and 
hedonic hypocrisy depend on the overarching goal that is salient when a 
moral stance is taken. Overarching goals filter the selective activation of 
whole sets of more concrete subgoals by affecting what we attend to and 
what we ignore, what we like and dislike, what alternatives we consider, 
and what criteria for goal achievement are being applied. Depending on 
which overarching goal of a person is most strongly activated (“salient”) at 
a given moment, a different set of preferences is activated and different 
alternatives will be considered. Fourth, two overarching goals are particu-
larly relevant for sincerity versus hedonic hypocrisy: the normative goal “to 
do what is right and morally appropriate” versus the hedonic goal “to do 
what feels good.”3 Both overarching goals are chronically activated to some 
degree, but situationally one is more strongly activated (“salient”) than the 
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other, depending on the cues in the situation. When the normative goal is 
salient, hedonic aspects are pushed into the background and inhibited to 
various degrees, and a moral stance expresses a person’s feeling of obliga-
tion to behave morally. It is sincere in this sense. When the hedonic goal is 
salient, the normative goal is pushed into the background, and a moral 
stance may be expressed to improve the way one feels right now, rather than 
to convey a goal to behave morally. This latter effect is stronger, the more 
salient the hedonic goal. Fifth, importantly, cues in the environment can 
change the salience of overarching goals. This can create considerable situ-
ational changes in what alternatives a person chooses in that situation, what 
she reacts to and how, and what goal criteria are used (Keizer et al., 2013).
Sixth, (a) when the hedonic goal is salient, persons are very likely to seek 
opportunities and affordances that may make them feel better (such as taking 
a moral stance), but also to shy away from, and avoid, activities and situations 
that would make them feel worse (such as exerting effort, sacrificing). In 
other words, one does not feel bad about not acting on one’s expressed moral 
commitment if this expression was done to feel good rather than to reveal 
one’s moral commitment. What makes one feel bad is making a hedonic sac-
rifice (such as exerting effort). Thus, when acting morally involves such a 
sacrifice, the focus on feeling good can create hedonic hypocrisy because 
what feels good is both taking the moral stance and avoiding the sacrifice. (b) 
This effect is stronger, the more salient the hedonic goal.
Seventh, the strong tendency for consistency (Gawronski and Strack, 
2012) is not sidelined in hedonic hypocrisy. Rather, the theory of overarch-
ing goals implies that the relevant drive for consistency in the expressive 
moral domain is not focused on the relationship between moral stance and 
behavior, but rather on the consistency between the salient overarching goal 
and moral stance on the one hand and the salient overarching goal and 
behavior on the other. Traditionally, hypocrisy has been applied to an incon-
sistency between expressed moral commitment and displayed moral behav-
ior. Yet, in line with the reasoning by Monin and Merritt (2012), mentioned 
above, and based on goal-framing theory, we argue that hypocrisy can also 
concern one’s being hypocritical even though the expressed moral stance is 
about norms that are unrelated to the moral behavior that is asked for in a 
particular situation. It is a matter of where the consistency pressure comes 
from: does it come from the relationship between moral stance and behavior 
(“practice what you preach”) or from the relationship between overarching 
goal with both the moral stance and with behavior? We claim that it is the 
latter: we always have to deal with a dual consistency, one between moral 
stance and overarching goal and one between overarching goal and behav-
ior. Thus, with a salient normative goal, both the moral stance and the 
behavior should be consistent with “appropriateness” (which makes the 
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consistency between moral stance and behavior then a side effect). With a 
salient hedonic goal, both the moral stance and the behavior should be con-
sistent with “feeling good” (Tice et al., 2001; see also Rustichini and 
Villeval, 2014), making the relationship between moral stance and behavior 
not relevant in terms of consistency, thus also allowing blatant but psycho-
logically irrelevant inconsistencies (see Figure 1). The fact that there is no 
independent consistency pressure between moral stance and behavior has 
important consequences. Thus, when a moral stance is expressed in the con-
text of a salient hedonic goal (i.e. to make one feel good), the framing of this 
expression is disconnected from the activation of moral concerns (such as 
guilt or feeling bad about not acting on the basis of the expressed commit-
ment). To repeat, “Feeling bad” in such a situation comes from hedonic 
discomfort (such as exerting effort) not from moral discomfort (such as 
feeling guilty). The dual consistency pressures that are linked to the salient 
overarching goal rather than to the relationship of moral stance to behavior 
thus allow a form of hypocrisy that is based on doing what feels good rather 
than on “practice what you preach.” This implies that for somebody to be 
hedonically hypocritical, the norms concerning the moral behavior asked 
for in a particular situation and the norms expressed in the moral stance 
(which presumable signals “I am a moral person”) don’t have to match.
Figure 1. Theory: Consistency pressure regarding moral stance and anticipated 
behavior applies first and foremost to the relation with the overarching goal, not 
to the relation of moral stance to anticipated behavior. For people with a strong 
hedonic goal this means that a stringent moral stance and behavior will not be 
consistent with each other if the anticipated moral behavior would be expected 
not to feel good (e.g. much effort) even though it is morally the appropriate 
behavior. A hedonic shift can thus create hedonic moral hypocrisy.
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Hypotheses
From this theory, we can derive a number of testable hypotheses. Our first 
hypothesis concerns the effect of mood on the stringency of moral stance. 
This makes it possible to be hedonically hypocritical even when no behavior 
is involved: the expressed moral stance is then simply meant to make one 
feel good, rather than to express a moral commitment. When the hedonic 
goal is salient and people are given the opportunity to express a moral stance, 
then people in a sad mood (who have a higher need to make themselves feel 
better than people in a happy mood) should take this opportunity to make 
themselves feel better by expressing a more stringent moral stance than 
happy people. By contrast, when the normative goal is salient, moral stance 
is not likely to be used to improve the way one feels, and thus, mood (i.e. 
being happy or sad) should have no influence on the stringency of the 
expressed moral stance. Even though no behavior is involved, the stringent 
moral stance is sincere in the latter case and hedonically hypocritical in the 
former case.
A hedonic shift is the effect of cues in the situation on the salience of the 
hedonic goal. Our other hypotheses concern the link of moral stance to 
behavior, given a hedonic shift. Our second hypothesis is that a stronger 
hedonic shift makes it more likely that people will take a stringent moral 
stance and yet not act morally. Thus, the strength of a hedonic shift should 
positively influence hedonic hypocrisy. Our third hypothesis concerns the 
effect of effort on moral hypocrisy. Given a hedonic shift, the higher the 
sacrifice for behaving morally (in terms of effort), the less likely people will 
act morally and the more likely that they are hedonically hypocritical. 
Without a hedonic shift, the level of sacrifice for behaving morally (in terms 
of effort) will have less nor no effect on acting morally and hedonic hypoc-
risy. Our fourth hypothesis concerns the possibility that hedonic shifts make 
one hypocritical even when the moral stance is not related to the moral 
behavior asked in the specific situation.
Will these hypotheses stand up to test? Experiments that allow causal 
inference seem the most adequate to answer this question. In such experi-
ments, a condition with cues that shift the salience of the hedonic goal 
upward can be compared to a situation in which this is not the case or with 
a condition with cues that shift the salience of the normative goal upward. 
By assigning subjects randomly to a hedonic shift condition, we make sure 
that differences in hedonic hypocrisy, if any, are due to the particular condi-
tion and not to differences in the subjects’ inherent moral commitment. In 
the following, we will test the first hypothesis in Study 1 and the other three 
hypotheses in Study 2.
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Study 1: the hedonic effect of mood on the 
stringency of moral stance
People in a bad mood are clearly more in need of improving the way they 
feel than those in a good mood (Tice et al., 2001). The important questions 
to be answered for testing our first hypothesis are (a) Do people, when 
shifted hedonically, use a stringent moral stance to improve their mood? (b) 
Do people, when shifted normatively, not use a moral stance to improve 
their mood? The prediction then is the following: When subjects in the 
hedonic shift condition are confronted with the request to express a moral 
stance, those with a bad mood should use this opportunity to improve the 
way they feel by expressing a stringent moral stance. When subjects in the 
hedonic shift condition are in a good mood, however, they are not expected 
to be particularly motivated to enhance the way they feel and thus predicted 
to express a less stringent moral stance than those in a bad mood. If a moral 
stance in the hedonic shift condition is indeed used to improve the way one 
feels (as repair for a bad mood), there should be no difference in mood 
between the two mood conditions after the expression of a moral stance. For 
subjects in the normative shift condition, the expectations are completely 
different. Their expressed moral stance should be stringent, but because the 
normative and not the hedonic goal is salient, mood states (i.e. the differ-
ence in need to improve the way one feels) should make little difference 
with regard to the expressed moral stance.
The experiment4
The main part of the experiment consisted of six blocks: First, shifting the 
overarching goals in a hedonic or a normative direction (independent vari-
able), followed by mood induction (independent variable), and then elicit-
ing a moral stance (as a dependent variable) with regard to environmental 
behavior. Because we used this particular moral stance, we subsequently 
assessed biospheric (i.e. environmental) values (as control variable related 
to the moral stance). At the end, we administered a mood test, and we 
offered funnel questions about understanding the questions and demograph-
ics. Participants were 80 students (25 males and 55 females) recruited from 
several faculties of a Dutch university with a promotional flyer (offering €5 
for participation).
Goal shift manipulation. Subjects were randomly assigned to the normative 
shift condition or the hedonic shift condition.5 Our manipulation of overarch-
ing goals makes use of quite stereotypical cue effects and effect differences 
for males and females. These cue effects, whatever their political 
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correctness, are chosen on the basis of the literature and with the aim to 
maximize the effect. To create an upward hedonic shift for male participants 
in the hedonic shift condition, we used the picture of a sexy model and asked 
subjects to evaluate the model on three hedonic dimensions (beauty, attrac-
tiveness, and pleasure), using 7-point Likert-type scale. Men have been 
shown to have a greater degree of hedonic activation (in the amygdala and 
the hypothalamus) when viewing erotic images than women (Hamann et al., 
2004, see also Bradley et al., 2001). Some previous studies in Belgium had 
also used a hedonic upshift manipulations for men (in this case operational-
ized as impatience in the form of discounting of monetary rewards) success-
fully by exposing them to pictures of attractive women in bikinis. For women 
in the hedonic shift condition, we used the picture of an attractive looking 
chocolate cake and asked subjects to evaluate it on three hedonic dimensions 
(beauty, attractiveness, and pleasure). The hedonic impact of chocolate had 
been shown to be higher for women than for men (Rozin et al., 1991). Choc-
olate is very popular in the Northern European Countries (Chocolates, Bis-
cuits & Confectionery of Europe (CAOBISCO), 2013). In addition, 
experiments in Belgium had found that sweets increased hedonic reactions 
(impatience) for females (Briers et al., 2006). In short, even though it fol-
lowed stereotypical differences between men and women, our experimental 
manipulation of a hedonic shift was carefully chosen.
The upward shift of the normative goal was induced by asking male and 
female participants to study a picture of a statue of lady justice and evaluate 
it, using 7-point Likert-type scales, on three normative dimensions (solem-
nity, dignity, and righteousness). We did not include a manipulation check, 
because questions measuring the strength of hedonic or normative goals are 
themselves activators of overarching goals that could disturb our activation 
procedure. Instead, we relied on the indirect evidence for our manipulations 
based on the differences between the goal-shift and mood conditions 
(Spencer et al., 2005).
Mood induction. To manipulate mood, participants were asked to briefly 
describe a personal memory in which they felt intensely happy (positive 
mood) or unhappy (negative mood). This manipulation proved successful in 
past research (e.g. Manucia et al., 1984; Schwartz and Clore, 1983).
Expressed moral stance. For measuring the moral stance, we made two basic 
assumptions. First, agreeing with a norm means endorsing it, expressing 
commitment to the norm. Second, since we want to use norms that subjects 
endorse at least to some degree (i.e. that are widespread in the student popu-
lation), we use norms concerning saving the environment. The moral 
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dimension is related to serving collective goals and interests, and by now, 
concern for resources of future generations has the status of a collective 
concern, especially for younger and more highly educated people. Thus, 
norms concerning wasting or damaging natural resources can be assumed to 
be moral norms in our student population. We measured biospheric values 
(BVs), as a control variable, because such norms are presumably stronger 
for people with stronger BVs (Steg et al., 2011). The moral stance may thus 
be governed by the BVs rather than differences in mood; hence, the ques-
tion is whether moral hypocrisy concerning environmental norms would 
still be observed even if we control for BVs. In measuring BVs, we assumed 
that expressing these values (contrary to a moral stance) is not used to 
improve one’s mood. We also tested whether this assumption holds (see 
below).
In the hedonic bad mood condition, expressing a stringent moral stance 
is presumably done to make one feel better. To measure the stringency of an 
expressed moral stance, participants evaluated four scenarios of environ-
mentally harmful behavior (7-point scale ranging from being totally ok (1) 
to being definitely wrong (7)) in situations in which the moral choice (i.e. 
agreeing or disagreeing with something) reflects being “virtuous,” that is, 
one that can be expected to be met with approval (and thus to improve the 
way one feels). One was about taking the car rather than walking to work; 
one was about dumping turpentine down the drain rather than taking the 
trouble to bring it to the chemical disposal site; one was about turning up the 
thermostat rather than taking the trouble to fetch a sweater upstairs; and one 
was about throwing glass in the general container rather than taking the 
trouble of separating the trash. A moral stance score was computed by aver-
aging the judgments of the four scenarios (Cronbach’s α = 0.70, M = 4.29, 
standard deviation (SD) = 1.09); the higher the score, the more stringent the 
expressed moral stance.
For measuring values, we applied a frequently used instrument taken 
from De Groot and Steg (2008). By placing the value assessment after the 
moral stance, we could be reasonably confident that expressing BVs would 
not be used to repair one’s mood, since mood repair (if any) happened 
already through expressing the moral stance. Extra evidence that the envi-
ronmental judgments expressed subjects’ own norms is the fact that all sub-
jects endorsed BVs with at least “important.”
Mood repair test. To test this null-result, participants were, at the end of the 
experiment, asked to fill in a 9-point Manikin scale where 1 meant “very 
happy,” and 9 “very sad.” The functionality of this Manikin scale for meas-
uring mood has been established before (Bradley and Lang, 1994).
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Results
Since we predicted that the only difference in the stringency of moral stance 
would be in the hedonic condition between good and bad mood (a combina-
tion of effects that would suppress detecting an interaction effect), our test 
for these very specific predictions consisted of univariate fixed-effect anal-
yses of variance (ANOVAs) with BVs as covariate, one for each goal condi-
tion. Figure 2 shows the mean moral stance for each goal condition. The 
ANOVA models for each goal condition are both significant: F(2, 37) = 9.667, 
p < 0.001 for the hedonic shift conditions, and F(2, 39) = 3.620, p = 0.037 for 
the normative shift condition. For the hedonic shift condition, moral stance 
is significantly associated with BVs, as we would expect (F(1, 39) = 13.085, 
p = 0.001). But we also see that mood (happy/sad) has a separate significant 
effect on moral stance: the sad mood is, as predicted, associated with a more 
stringent moral stance (F(1, 39) = 5.592, p = 0.023). In the normative goal 
condition, moral stance also has the expected positive association with BVs 
(F(1, 39) = 7.038, p = 0.011), but mood has, as predicted, no effect on moral 
stance (F(1, 39) = 0.904, p = 0.345).6 That expressing one’s BVs was not 
used to improve the way one feels is supported by the fact that (as expected) 
BVs did not differ between the goal-shift conditions (BVnorm = 3.89, 
BVhedon = 3.65, t(78) = 0.768, p = 0.445). This also holds for BVs in the dif-
ferent mood conditions (p = 0.822 within the hedonic shift condition, and 
p = 0.127 within the normative shift condition).
Possible evidence that mood was actually repaired after expressing the 
moral stance came from our post-moral-stance measurement of mood. A 
univariate fixed-effect ANOVA with final mood state as dependent variable 
and goal and mood conditions as fixed factors showed that there was no 
Figure 2. Effects of overarching goals (normative, hedonic) on the severity of 
a moral stance (Y axis), depending on the mood condition (happy, sad). Given a 
hedonic shift, only subjects in the sad mood condition express a moral stance that 
is as stringent as for subjects in the normative shift condition.
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difference between conditions and also no interactions effect between goal 
and mood conditions (F(3, 79) = 0.336, p = 0.800). On average, all partici-
pants were in a pleasant mood at the end of the experiment: on a scale from 
1 (“very happy”) to 9 (“very sad”), the mean score was Mmood = 3.24, 
SD = 1.33, indicating that on average participants were in a pleasant mood 
at this stage of the experiment. While this is no definite proof, this finding 
supports the assumption that expressing a stringent moral stance helps (and 
was used) to repair a depressed mood state.
Discussion
An important mechanism behind hedonic hypocrisy expressed in our first 
hypothesis was corroborated by this study: with a salient normative goal, 
mood does not influence the stringency of a moral stance, but with a salient 
hedonic goal, a sad mood leads to a more stringent moral stance than a good 
mood. Subjects had been randomly assigned to goal and mood conditions, 
so that there was no reason to assume systematic differences in moral stance 
between conditions before treatment. The fact that we did find a difference 
between the good and bad mood conditions within the hedonic condition 
and not within the normative conditions suggests that expressing a stringent 
moral stance was indeed used to repair a sad mood by making one feel good 
about oneself with a “virtuous” moral stance in the hedonic shift condition, 
but not in the normative shift condition. This difference in effects between 
normative and hedonic shift conditions supports our first hypothesis.
An alternative explanation, based on negative state relief theory (Cialdini 
et al., 1981), could be that sad memories make people use stringent moral 
stances as a relief for their sad mood, whereas people in a happy mood don’t 
do that. Indeed, this and the goal-framing explanation use a very similar logic 
about the effect of sad mood in a hedonic state. But where the two theories 
differ is in the role of overarching goals. In state relief theory, overarching 
goals play no role, whereas in goal-framing theory, they do. The results sup-
port the latter by showing that the effect of mood on moral stance occurs only 
in the hedonic condition and it thus conditioned by the salient goal.
Study 1 made a first step testing the theory concerning hedonic hypocrisy. 
Yet, the implication that if people take amoral stance only to feel good, they 
will not act on it when it takes effort to do so still remains to be tested. Thus, 
for our second study, the general question was Is it true that a hedonic shift 
will create moral hypocrisy by making people not only take a stringent moral 
stance just to improve the way they feel but also by reducing their willingness 
to do things that take effort (because that would make one feel worse)?
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Study 2: hedonic hypocrisy and behavior
Here, we define hedonic hypocrisy in terms of giving oneself a moral air (by 
expressing a stringent moral stance) and yet not acting morally when an 
occasion to do so arises. The central questions of Study 2 concern the test of 
all the other three hypotheses: (a) does a stronger hedonic shift indeed lead 
to more hedonic hypocrisy? Because subjects who do not take a stringent 
moral stance are not hedonically hypocritical, irrespective of whether or not 
they behave morally, the prediction is thus not that hedonically hypocrite 
subjects would behave less morally than non-hypocritical subjects, but 
rather that there are more hedonically hypocritical subjects in the hedonic 
shift conditions compared to the normative condition. (b) Does a hedonic 
shift indeed make it more likely that a higher effort level for moral behavior 
leads to more hedonic hypocrisy? (c) Is true that the relevant consistency 
criterion involves the fit of both moral stance and of behavior with the sali-
ent overarching goal, rather than the fit between moral stance and moral 
behavior? If true, this would mean that in a normative condition, both the 
moral stance and the behavior must be related to “appropriateness,” and in 
a hedonic condition, both the moral stance and the behavior must be related 
“to feeling good.” The operational version of this hypothesis is with a 
hedonic shift, hedonic hypocrisy is likely to occur even though the moral 
stance is not related to the behavior. Without such a shift, hedonic hypocrisy 
is not likely to occur.
In order to test these conjectures, we use different kinds of norms for the 
expressed moral stance and the moral behavior, and we vary both the inten-
sity of the hedonic shift and the intensity of the sacrifice (effort) involved in 
acting morally. With a high-intensity hedonic shift, we should observe a 
combination of stringent moral stance and effort avoidance (i.e. avoid feel-
ing bad), so that even a small hedonic sacrifice will suffice to tempt people 
not to act morally. Conversely, with a low intensity hedonic shift, only a 
more sizable sacrifice should make people hedonically hypocritical. Without 
a hedonic shift, people should be both stringent in their moral stance and 
willing to behave morally, even when this is costly in terms of effort (within 
limits, see Lindenberg and Steg, 2007).
As in the first experiment, negative state relief theory (Cialdini et al., 
1981) might supply an alternative interpretation (based on mood) for the 
effects we observe, because the theory predicts that both a stringent moral 
stance and moral behavior are the result of subjects repairing a bad mood. 
Thus, subjects in a bad mood would in any case be less likely to be hypo-
critical than subjects in a good mood, no matter what the hedonic shift con-
dition is. Goal-framing theory, by contrast, predicts that a bad mood will 
only lead to a more stringent moral stance when there is a hedonic shift. It 
406 Rationality and Society 30(4)
also predicts that with a hedonic shift, subjects in a bad mood would be less 
likely to act morally and more likely to be hypocritical. In short, the predic-
tions differ considerably.
The effects of the hedonic shifts may be blocked or at least diminished if 
subjects have a strong predisposition to make a good impression (trait 
impression management). How strong are the situational effects of hedonic 
shifts in comparison to these dispositional effects? We included trait impres-
sion management to compare the situational influence of the hedonic shift 
conditions with the influence of such a trait, but for reasons of space, we 
reported this part in the Supplemental Material (SI).
The experiment7
To test the effect of the intensity of the hedonic shift on effort sensitivity and 
effort avoidance, we varied two things: the intensity of the hedonic shift and 
the amount of effort needed for the moral behavior. For this purpose, we 
chose to create the hedonic shift in a way that would allow us to graduate 
the intensity of the shift: with ambient smells (as detailed below). The main 
part of the experiment was structured into seven blocks: first, the hedonic 
shift manipulation via the ambient smell, which was present throughout the 
experiment (independent variable); second, an impatience test (as a manipu-
lation check, reported in the Supplementary Material (SI) in more detail); 
third, a mood assessment; fourth, a set of moral endorsements to establish a 
moral stance (as our first dependent variables); fifth, a seemingly incidental 
request to help (as our second dependent variable); sixth, the assessment of 
trait impression management. Finally, seventh, we supplied the same funnel 
questions as in our first study. Participants were 135 students (40 males and 
95 females) from the psychology department of a Dutch university who 
participated for course credit.8
Goal shift manipulation. We reasoned that students who volunteer for experi-
ments not for money but in order to fulfill their obligatory course require-
ments generally come to do what is expected of them, to follow instructions 
and behave appropriately (i.e. have a fairly salient normative goal). We thus 
used this as a “normative” basis condition that is compared to two intensities 
of a hedonic shift. For this shift, we wanted to use a way to make subjects 
more hedonic that could be graduated in its effect: ambient smells. There is 
an olfactory–limbic interconnection so that ambient smells activate visceral 
reactions, thereby strengthening the hedonic goal (Li, 2008; Schnall et al., 
2008). Because smell is known to be a stronger hedonic stimulus than visual 
or auditory stimuli (Royet et al., 2000), it promised to be an effective means 
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for our hedonic shift manipulation. And because a pleasant smell has been 
shown to elicit a weaker hedonic reaction than an unpleasant smell (Carretie 
et al., 2001; Zald and Pardo, 1997), we decided to make use of this variation 
to graduate the hedonic shift. There were thus three goal conditions: the nor-
mative condition without ambient smell; a condition with a light visceral 
stimulus (an ambient pleasant cake smell) for a light hedonic shift; and a 
stronger visceral stimulus (an unpleasant ambient fart smell) for a stronger 
hedonic shift condition (see SI for more details of the manipulation).
Manipulation check. As the hedonic goal is oriented toward the short term 
(Lindenberg and Steg, 2007), subjects in the hedonic shift condition should 
show more impatience than subjects in the normative condition. A hedonic 
shift is supposed to create impatience (Li, 2008). This allowed us to use it 
as a manipulation check on our hedonic shift conditions. We therefore 
included a variant of a test for delay discounting used by Van den Bergh 
et al. (2008). We used two versions, one positively and one negatively 
worded for all subjects. In the positive version, we asked participants to 
imagine they had won €15 in a lottery and asked how much money they 
would like to have in a month such that it would be as much worth to them 
as the €15 right now. In the negative version, we asked how much money 
they would like to pay in a month for a fine of €15 so that it would be worth 
as much as paying the fine right now (assuming there is no risk that they 
couldn’t pay in a month). We used a log function of the area under the curve 
(Myerson et al., 2001) for a univariate ANOVA.
Mood. Mood was assessed, using the same Manikin test (Bradley and Lang, 
1994) as in Study 1 (a 9-point Manikin scale where 1 meant “very happy” 
and 9 “very sad”).
Moral stance. In order to make sure that the norms we use are endorsed by 
the subjects prior to the experiment, we let students express a moral stance 
with moral norms that a prior pilot study showed to be endorsed in our stu-
dent population (see SI for detail). To use a moral stance that comes close to 
everyday social situations, we made use of a set of seven endorsements 
regarding social norms with a compound measure of severity of each 
endorsement (Lindenberg and Steg, 2013) that invites taking a moral stance. 
It does not only contain judgments about the importance of the particular 
norm for oneself, but also the disapproval of transgression by others and the 
expressed degree of one’s own conformity to this norm (all on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale). These norms were not rock-bottom such as “do not steal” 
but day-to-day social norms. This pretest made us quite confident that these 
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seven norms are reasonably well established in the student population and 
yet able to vary in stringency. They all are dealing with negative externali-
ties for others (which gives them a “moral” character). Sample norms are 
“to throw trash in the trashcan and not on the street” and “to be silent in the 
library” (see SI for more detail). For each of these norms, three questions 
were asked on a 7-point Likert-type scale: “do you find this norm impor-
tant” (1 = very unimportant and 7 = very important); “How do you judge oth-
ers not keeping to this norm?” (1 = very negative and 7 = very positive, 
reverse coded); and “Do you yourself keep to this norm?” (1 = never and 
7 = always). Alphas for the three judgments per norm ranged between 0.66 
and 0.89. The average score of these three answers over the seven norms 
indicates the degree of expressed stringency of a moral stance.
Moral behavior. When the experiment was seemingly ended, after the moral 
endorsements, we introduced the moral behavior as a voluntary extra task. 
Selflessly helping others in need is a kind of moral behavior and a generally 
shared social norm (Osswald et al., 2010). We operationalized moral behav-
ior as being willing to help a fellow student in urgent need of volunteers 
(about filling out a questionnaire), without any extra credits. We purpose-
fully chose an “unexpected” request for help, so that subjects could decline 
to help without ill feelings, since they easily could come up with a good 
excuse not to do it (“didn’t anticipate this, have no time”). Since subjects in 
all hedonic shift conditions could have a good excuse not to help the student 
in need because they did not know it in advance and might not have time, 
there is “moral wriggle room” (Dana et al., 2007) and it is the same for all 
conditions.
Related to helping were two sacrifice conditions that varied the effort 
required for helping. In the low sacrifice condition, it was said that the ques-
tionnaire takes about 2 minutes to fill in. In the higher sacrifice condition, it 
was said that it takes about 15 minutes to fill in. Participants were told that 
if they agreed to volunteer, they would proceed to a different room (i.e. a 
room without ambient smell) after the experiment and fill in a questionnaire 
(of either 2 or 15 minutes length). Those who agreed to help actually had to 
fill in a questionnaire.
Hedonic hypocrisy. We conceptualized hedonic hypocrisy as giving oneself 
moral airs concerning norms one endorses (by expressing that one finds the 
string of day-to-day social norms important, by disapproval of other who 
don’t follow these day-to-day social norm, and by claiming to follow these 
norms oneself) and by, a minute later, not being willing to help a fellow 
student in need. Participants who have at least a median stringency of moral 
stance but refused to help were considered hedonically hypocritical. We 
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chose for the median rather than the scale midpoint because the severity of 
moral stance can differ for different norms, and hypocrisy is conceptually 
taking a moral stance at the higher end of the distribution without acting on 
it. The median stringency of the moral stance was 5.13 (on a 7-point scale).
Results
Impatience as manipulation check. We found no effect for the positive version 
of the impatience measure, but we did find an effect for the negatively worded 
measure in the predicted direction: an overall significant difference between 
the goal conditions in the discounting ratelog (Mnormative = 0.965, Mlight = 0.951, 
Mstrong = 0.911, F = 3.252(2), N = 131, p = 0.042), where a lower score indicates 
more discounting. Given that losses loom larger than gains, the reason we 
only found an impatience effect for the negatively worded measure might be 
that dealing with a debt responds more sensitively to a hedonic shift than deal-
ing with a gain (for more detailed results, see SI).
Helping. We did not expect the severity of the moral stance to differ between 
the goal conditions, and we also find no significant differences: Mnorm = 5.10, 
Mlighthedon = 5.28, and Mstronghedon = 5.36 (F(2, 134) = 1.114, p = 0.331). Rather, 
we expected helping to differ in the hedonic shift conditions. An omnibus χ2 
test for helping in the goal and sacrifice conditions showed a significant 
result (χ2(5) = 21.966, p = 0.001, ϕ = 0.403). In the hedonic shift conditions, 
Figure 3. Percentage of participants who are willing to help (Y axis), dependent 
on hedonic shift condition and two effort levels for helping (2 vs 15 minutes).
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we see the effort level having an effect on helping. In the 2-minute light 
hedonic shift condition, 88% helps versus 68% in the 15-minute condition. 
In the 2-minute strong hedonic shift condition, the percentage is 60% in the 
2-minute condition, compared to 48% in the 15-minute condition (Figure 
3). In the normative 2-minute condition, 95% of the subjects help, com-
pared to 90% in the normative 15-minute condition. Thus, in the normative 
condition, the effort level plays, as expected, practically no role. Looking 
just at the effect of the goal conditions, we see that more participants were 
willing to help in the normative condition than in the hedonic shift condi-
tions: 93% of the participants in the normative condition were willing to 
help, versus 67% in the combined hedonic shift conditions, which is a sig-
nificant difference (χ2(1) = 10.98, p = 0.001, ϕ = 0.285). Within the hedonic 
shift condition, the helping effect is indeed graduated: In the light hedonic 
shift condition, 78% of the participants were willing to help, versus 54% in 
the strong hedonic shift conditions, which is a significant difference too 
(χ2(1) = 6.04, p = 0.014, ϕ = 0.258).
Hedonic hypocrisy. An omnibus χ2 test for hypocrisy in the goal and sacrifice 
conditions showed a significant effect of these conditions on hedonic hypoc-
risy (χ2(5) = 20.718, p = 0.001, η = 0.392). In the hedonic shift conditions, 
we see the effort level having an effect on hypocrisy. In the 2-minute light 
Figure 4. Percentage of participants who are hedonically hypocritical, dependent 
on hedonic shift condition and two effort levels for helping (2 minutes versus 15 
minutes)
Lindenberg et al. 411
hedonic shift condition 4% is hypocritical versus 16% in the 15-minute con-
dition. In the 2-minute strong hedonic shift condition, the percentage is 
30%, compared to 38% in the 15-minute condition (Figure 4). In the norma-
tive 2-minute condition, no subject is hypocritical, and in the normative 
15-minute condition, only 5% is hypocritical. Thus, for hypocrisy too, the 
effort level plays virtually no role in the normative condition. Looking just 
at the effect of the goal conditions, we see that in the normative hedonic 
shift condition, 2% of the participants are hypocritical. In the light hedonic 
shift condition, 10% are hypocritical, and in strong hedonic shift condition, 
34% are hypocritical. Does the willingness to help decrease indeed with 
increasing hedonic shifts because of increasing hedonic hypocrisy or for 
some other reason? We can check on this by looking at a condition in which 
we expect (and find) a fairly large number of non-helpers: the strong hedonic 
shift condition. If the behavioral effects in this condition had nothing to do 
with hedonic hypocrisy but only with the willingness to help, the proportion 
among the non-helpers of hedonically hypocritical and not-hypocritical 
subjects should be about even. However, we see that the hypocritical non-
helpers (74%) significantly outnumber the non-hypocritical non-helpers 
(26%; z = 2.09, p = 0.036). Thus, the evidence speaks for a genuine effect of 
hedonic hypocrisy.
In sum, just as they did for the moral behavior (helping someone in 
need), the intensity of the hedonic shift and the level of effort matter for 
hedonic hypocrisy, which supports our second and third hypotheses. And 
because we find these effects even though the particular moral stance was 
unrelated to the moral behavior in question, we also see that the fourth 
hypothesis about goal consistency is supported. Additional support for our 
findings comes from the fact that we find very similar results when using 
vignettes of moral dilemmas (such as the famous trolley dilemma where 
you can save five men by deliberately killing one man through hitting a 
switch of a trolley). These results are reported in the SI.
Mood effects
In the normative condition, we find no effects of mood on moral stance, 
moral behavior or hypocrisy. This contradicts the prediction of state relief 
theory and supports a version of our first hypothesis (“mood effects on 
prosocial behavior and hedonic hypocrisy are dependent on a hedonic 
shift”). In the light hedonic shift condition, there are also no mood effects. 
All mood effects are concentrated in the strong hedonic shift condition. 
There, we find, as expected by both goal-framing and state relief theories, a 
positive effect of bad mood on stringent moral stance (median or higher), 
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but it is only marginally significant (χ2(1) = 2.755, p = 0.097). However, 
supporting the predictions of goal framing against the state relief predic-
tions, we also find a significant negative effect of bad mood on moral 
behavior (χ2(1) = 5.711, p = 0.017, ϕ = 0.373) and a significant positive 
effect of bad mood on being hedonically hypocritical (χ2(1) = 8.785, 
p = 0.003, ϕ = 0.463).
Discussion
Because, in theory, being hedonic increases both the stringency of the moral 
stance and the degree of effort avoidance, we expected a graduated likeli-
hood of hedonic hypocrisy that increased with the strength of the hedonic 
shift and with the amount of the required effort for helping. The results of 
Study 2 show the likelihood of hedonic hypocrisy increased with the 
strength of the hedonic shift and with the amount of required effort for help-
ing behavior. By varying the effort level involved in helping, we could also 
show that in the light and strong hedonic shift conditions, the likelihood of 
hedonic hypocrisy increased as the sacrifice became larger. In short, these 
two ways of testing the influence of hedonicness on hedonic hypocrisy pro-
duced support for the hedonic shift hypotheses based on goal-framing the-
ory. We also saw that the goal-framing predictions with regard to the effect 
of (bad) mood on moral stance, moral behavior, and hypocrisy were better 
supported than the predictions from state relief theory (for which both moral 
stance and moral behavior are simply instruments for making one feel bet-
ter). This is an important finding as state relief theory is arguably the closest 
competitor to goal-framing theory with regard to the hedonic hypocrisy. 
Moral wiggle room can also not explain our results because the wiggle 
room was identical for all conditions.
General discussion
Hedonic hypocrisy is a special form of hypocrisy that has not received much 
attention in the literature so far. Casual empiricism has it that next to prag-
matic hypocrisy (which refers to pretending commitment to norms one does 
not endorse in order to realize some advantage or transgressing one’s own 
norms for financial gain), there is a form of moral hypocrisy that may in fact 
be even more widespread than pragmatic hypocrisy. It refers to the fact that 
in some situations, people are sincere when they express commitment to 
norms they endorse, and in other situations, their expression of moral com-
mitment is not sincere, even concerning norms they endorse and even with-
out expecting some extrinsic advantage for transgressing the norms. We call 
this form hedonic hypocrisy. There are examples abound from everyday 
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life, such as people endorsing the norm to contribute to collective goods in 
general and expressing their commitment to a civic spirit, but not actually 
contributing to a concrete collective good.
Theoretically, hedonic hypocrisy is puzzling: how can it be that one is 
hypocritical even concerning one’s own norms and when there is no entice-
ment to “sell” one’s moral convictions? Theories of “moral wiggle room” that 
focus on people’s goal to feel moral (Dana et al., 2007) basically assume that 
everyone is hedonically hypocritical, but they neglect that people by and large 
also have a goal to be moral, not just to feel moral. The puzzling question is 
then, how people can change from one goal to the other and back.
A prominent step toward solving the puzzle of hedonic hypocrisy is that 
we have to take situational goals into consideration (Monin and Merritt, 
2012). On this basis, moral hypocrisy can be seen as not having an over-
arching moral goal when one appears or claims to have one. This goal 
approach is promising for solving the puzzle. However, because people 
sometimes are and sometimes are not hedonically hypocritical, we needed 
to go more deeply into the shifting salience of overarching goals (Lindenberg 
and Steg, 2007). Overarching goals govern what we attend to and what we 
ignore, what we like and dislike, what alternatives we consider, and what 
criteria for goal achievement are being applied. In this study, we suggested 
on the basis of goal-framing theory (Lindenberg and Steg, 2007; Steg et al., 
2016) how the shifting salience of overarching goals can actually create 
hedonic hypocrisy and under what conditions. We focused on two overarch-
ing goals: a normative goal to act appropriately (to do what is considered 
morally right and to follow situationally relevant norms) and a hedonic goal 
to improve the way one feels. The important feature of overarching goals is 
that their relative salience can change, especially due to cues in the environ-
ment (Keizer et al., 2008, 2013). A shift in the hedonic direction will 
increase people’s focus on doing things that feel good or make them feel 
better, whereas a shift in the normative direction will increase people’s 
focus on doing what is morally appropriate according to situationally rele-
vant norms. Attention to this effect of overarching goals is also what dif-
ferentiates goal-framing theory from theories of “moral wiggle room” 
(Dana et al., 2007; Gino et al., 2013) and state relief (Cialdini et al., 1981). 
For the latter two theories, there is no moral sincerity, as moral stance and 
moral behavior are always means to make one feel better; nor do these theo-
ries consider shifting goal salience effects. By contrast, for goal-framing 
theory, the normative overarching goal allows a state of sincerity, and devia-
tions from sincerity are created by upward shifts in the salience of the 
hedonic goal. In short, hedonic hypocrisy is made possible because, with a 
hedonic goal shift, people focus on affordances to make them feel better 
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(such as giving themselves moral airs) and on avoiding situations that would 
make them feel worse (such as avoiding the anticipated effort needed to 
help somebody in need).
We tested this goal-framing conception of hedonic hypocrisy in two dif-
ferent studies. In our first study, we showed that a stringent moral stance can 
indeed be used to make one feel better. More specifically, given a hedonic 
shift, feeling bad (i.e. being in a bad mood) led to a more stringent moral 
stance than feeling good (i.e. being in a good mood). By contrast, for par-
ticipants in the normative shift condition (focused on appropriateness), 
mood did not affect the stringency of the moral stance at all. Whatever 
strengthens the normative overarching goal, will also strengthen sincerity.
In the second study, we focused on the discrepancy between moral stance 
and behavior that transgressed one’s own norms without expecting to gain 
from doing so. We predicted and found that the hedonic shift effect is gradu-
ated: the stronger the shift, the lower the likelihood of moral behavior and the 
higher the likelihood of hedonic hypocrisy (the discrepancy between a strin-
gent moral stance and moral behavior). In addition, we found evidence for the 
effort avoidance effect of the hedonic goal: given a particular strength of the 
hedonic shift, the more effort is required for acting morally, the lower the like-
lihood of moral behavior and the higher the likelihood of hedonic hypocrisy. 
This is not just a matter of higher costs driving out moral behavior. Rather, the 
sensitivity to avoiding effort is especially strong with a hedonic shift. Without 
this shift, we found no evidence that the cost of moral behavior in terms of 
effort had an effect on the likelihood of moral action or on the likelihood of 
hypocrisy. Of course, in our experiment, even the high effort cost was not 
extreme. One would expect that truly high costs would have an effect on moral 
behavior even without a hedonic shift (Lindenberg and Frey, 1993).
Our studies underline the insight that human nature evolved, as it were, 
to let people be thoroughly influenced by the social environment, including 
influence on egoism and prosociality (Lindenberg, 2015b). This also 
increases the social significance of our findings. Hedonic hypocrisy under-
mines the workings of normative consensus because hedonically hypocriti-
cal people don’t act on the very norms they endorse when that involves 
some effort. In contradistinction to the case of pragmatic hypocrisy, trying 
to increase normative consensus would thus not help to reduce hedonic 
hypocrisy. If a society has many established mechanisms or experiences 
that make people hedonic (e.g. in the fun direction through advertisements, 
entertainment, and general legitimacy of consumption or in the fear direc-
tion by populist politicians, social media, economic uncertainties, crises, or 
wars and displacements), it is also likely that it makes people more hedoni-
cally hypocritical, and social media may be a new outlet for the hedonically 
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motivated stringent moral stance and hedonic hypocrisy of many (see also 
Stephens-Davidowitz, 2017).
What would help to reduce hedonic hypocrisy is to increase the salience of 
the normative goal. Yet, that increase, if it is brought about at all, often comes 
with the closing of group boundaries at the expense of inclusion, with sub-
groups becoming more exclusionary and intolerant (De Dreu et al., 2014). 
This leaves a formidable task for governments to create, maintain, and guard 
what has been called “weak solidarity” (Lindenberg, 2015a). In short, for very 
practical purposes such as policy, law, socialization practices, intervention 
programs, and informal human interaction, it makes a great deal of difference 
whether we deal only with pragmatic or also with hedonic hypocrisy.
Our studies have some limitations. First of all, the goal shifts are induced, 
but in the first study, only indirectly traced by their predicted consequences. 
This is a limitation often incurred in many activation studies because asking 
participants about their goals can interfere with the activation of the experi-
mentally manipulated goals. Second, we tested only three kinds of moral 
stances: one with environmental norms, one with everyday norms, and one 
(reported in the SI) with vignettes of moral dilemmas. Might a moral stance 
with certain other norms not be subject to hedonic hypocrisy? Future 
research would have to answer this question. Third, our dependent behavio-
ral variable in Studies 2 was helping, leaving open the question whether or 
not other kinds of prosocial behavior would be affected the same way. 
Assessing actual behavior, and graduating it according to effort needed, is 
already an advance over the many studies that only use “willingness to act,” 
but it would be desirable for future research to investigate different kinds of 
moral behavior in the context of hedonic hypocrisy.
Even though there are limitations to our studies, we believe that by elab-
orating a new paradigm for hedonic hypocrisy on the basis of goal-framing 
theory, and testing it from different angles, we advanced our understanding 
of the strong and yet subtle impact of cues in the environment on both the 
way we present ourselves and the way we act, as well as on the limited 
meaning of “normative consensus.” Despite the internalization of social 
norms and values, human beings are “merchants of morals” (Goffman, 
1959) to the degree their social environment fails to support a normative 
overarching goal against hedonic shifts. This makes hedonic hypocrisy a 
truly social phenomenon.
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Notes
1. By “moral” we refer to goals, attitudes, and behaviors that are positively 
directed toward the welfare of others or of the group as a whole, often codified 
in accepted social norms that indicate what is regarded as socially appropriate. 
Prosocial behavior and behavior that preserves the environment are subsets of 
moral behavior.
2. For simplicity’s sake, we will speak in the remainder of this article of “hedonic 
hypocrisy,” meaning “hedonic moral hypocrisy.”
3. A third overarching goal, called gain goal, oriented toward increasing one’s 
resources such as material advantages, is relevant for pragmatic hypocrisy, but 
this pragmatic hypocrisy is not part of the current investigation.
4. Some more details about the experiment can be found in the Supplementary 
Material (SI).
5. Because of hysteresis effects of overarching goals, the goal manipulation can-
not easily be reversed within the short time span of an experiment. For this rea-
son, our experiment has a between-subject rather than a within-subject design, 
even though the theory applies to within-subject effects. Our subject population 
was very homogeneous, except for gender. Gender differences in our results in 
Study 1 are reported in the SI.
6. If we leave biospheric values out, we get similar results. An independent t-test 
showed, that, in the hedonic condition, sad participants provided a more strin-
gent moral stance than happy participants t(38) = −3.13, p = 0.003, whereas in 
the normative condition, no significant difference in moral stance between 
happy and sad participants was found, t(38) = −0.825, p = 0.42.
7. More details about the experiment are reported in the SI.
8. Gender differences in our results for Study 2 are reported in the SI.
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Supplemental material for this article is available online.
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